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Path dependency and convergence of three worlds of welfare policy 
during the Great Recession: UK, Germany and Sweden 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates policy responses to the Great Recession in Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany. Faced with the global financial crisis in 2007, responses in the 
UHVSHFWLYHFRXQWULHVGLIIHUHGFRQVLGHUDEO\DQGIROORZHGWKH³ROG´SDWKs of their institutional 
legacies. We focus on labour market and social welfare policies and demonstrate how these 
differing responses were shaped by path dependent ideational paradigms. Since these 
paradigms are first and foremost carried by policy communities, the analysis does not, in 
contrast to prior studies, only rely on policy documents but outlines the process as seen from 
the perspective of key public officials and experts in the respective fields. The paper shows 
how the crisis was perceived and which kinds of arguments were used for explaining the 
liberal (UK), conservative (Germany) and social-democratic (Sweden) responses to crisis. 
 
Key words: welfare state, policy change, economic crisis, labour policy, path dependency, 
convergence 
 
Introduction 
Much scholarship about the retrenchment of the welfare state in Western Europe, and more 
specifically the analysis of reactions to the recent economic crisis, focuses on aggregate level 
economic trends, changed benefits and budget constraints (Armingeon 2012; Chung & 
Thewissen, 2011; Kersbergen et al., 2014; Pontusson & Raess, 2012; -yQVVRQ&6WHIiQVVRQ
2013; Streeck & Schäfer 2013). Such a focus on measurable overall outcomes is important for 
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better understanding political trends in times of crisis. However, researchers have also turned 
to more nuanced and contextually-informed accounts seeking to make sense of strategies of 
crisis response and policy change (Armingeon 2012; Armingeon et al. 2015; Farnsworth & 
Irving 2015; van Hooren et al., 2014; Shahidi  2015, Starke et al. 2014, Starke et al. 2013; 
Taylor-Gooby 2013). We aim to add to this field in welfare studies and crisis response by 
examining country-specific understandings of the crisis and the concomitant response from 
the perspective of key public officials and experts from the field of labour and social policies 
in three Northern European countries: Germany, Sweden, and the UK. These countries have 
been the object of intensive scrutiny on a variety of topics (e.g. Béland et al 2014; Kammer 
2012; Oesch 2006; Pontusson & Raess 2012; Thelen 2014) as they have often been taken to 
approximate the ideal typical welfare state regimes as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990; cf. 
Emmenegger et al. 2015): conservative, social democratic and liberal, respectively. The 
pressures on these three countries due to the crisis, although moderate compared to several 
Southern European states, were rather similar at first. However, the shape and form of crisis 
response differed significantly across the three cases. For example, Chung and Thewissen 
(2011, cf. Lallement 2011) suggested that short-term reactions to the Great Recession in these 
countries followed the well-known path defined by their institutional legacies. In the UK the 
crisis prompted severe cuts in benefits and public expenditure on welfare services. In Sweden 
significant cuts in welfare benefits were initiated before the crisis but were moderated, and in 
some instances reversed, in response to the crisis. Germany on the contrary responded by 
triggering its well-institutionalized support for its heavy industry but also pursued limited 
austerity. Against this description, other commentators, for example Shahidi (2015), claim 
that post-crisis changes to labour market policies in these three (and other) advanced welfare 
states did not IROORZWKH³ROG´SDWKVarguing that the variations are better explained by 
economic and fiscal conditions. Among others, Hermann (2014) argues that the hegemony of 
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neoliberal ideology in Europe is inflicting convergent crisis responses across countries (cf. 
Farnsworth & Irving 2012) and different welfare regime types.  
We propose that some disagreements in prior studies of crisis response are related to 
the empirical approaches focusing on policy documents and macroeconomic data which do 
not show in detail how path dependent pressures have played out in practice and shaped 
responses to the crisis. We contribute to the discussion by offering insights in how the 
normative legacies of these three ideational regimes enable and constrain particular labour 
and social reforms. Our investigation draws on interviews with more than 50 key public 
officials and experts in fields of labour market policy and social welfare policy.1 The 
interviews provide us with internal observations, understandings, and professional 
experiences of the crisis which enables us to better contextualize policy changes. Combined 
with the analysis of policy documents, these narratives show how ideational legacies and 
paradigmatic understandings shape policymaking in times of crisis. This approach not only 
provides a more complete picture of the crisis response in these countries, but, by highlighting 
the dominant narratives within the policy domain, better identifies the mechanisms behind 
outcomes of path dependency or convergence. 
  
Path dependency, convergence and the European welfare state after the 
crisis 
Recent research on reactions to economic crisis in European welfare states focuses mainly on 
social policy legislation and general macroeconomic evaluations of crisis. The common 
argument is that in many countries incremental crisis responses and the absence of 
                                                          
1 The empirical material for this article was retrieved in the framework of the international collaborative project 
LIVEWHAT (Living with hard times), funded by the EU FP7. All examined documents, as well as summaries of 
the interview material are available LQDIRUPRIWZRGHOLYHUDEOHVRIWKHSURMHFW6HHSURMHFW¶VZHEVLWH
http://www.livewhat.unige.ch/  
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fundamental changes are the result of path dependencies shaping policymaking (Chung & 
Thewissen, 2011; Kersbergen et al., 2014; Lallement 2011; Pontusson & Raess, 2012, van 
Hooren et al., 2014). Apart from the fact that large-scale organizations and redistributive 
institutional arrangements are difficult and costly to reform, there are also ideational 
components that create path dependent prHVVXUHV)URPWKLVSHUVSHFWLYH³[i]nstitutions frame 
the discourse, defining repertoires of more or less acceptable (and expectable) discursive 
LQWHUDFWLRQV´ 6FKPLGWS7KLVIXUWKHUFRQWULEXWHVWRWKHµVWLFNLQHVV¶RI
institutionalised practices, routines, and policies (Pierson, 2000). Institutions make up the 
framework of possibilities and constraints in which actors pursue their preferences. 
Policymakers act within policy paradigms which are expected to structure their crisis 
responses. As Immergut and Anderson (2008, p. 358) stated: 
Policy paradigms are the world views of bureaucrats, politicians, and other key 
political actors about the nature of policy problems and the range of potential and 
appropriate solutions. These paradigms constitute roadmaps that provide actors with 
cognitive tools and directions about how to interpret how key macro-institutions (like 
the economy) function. These cognitive understandings, in turn, shape the range of 
policy alternatives that come into focus. 
 
 This lack of ideational change has been illustrated in the way that coordinated market 
economies, such as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, reacted to the 
economic crisis with extended unemployment benefits and short term work schemes. Within 
this group, reactions differed between conservative regimes securing employment (e.g. 
Germany) and social democratic responses adjusting benefits for the unemployed (Sweden). 
In comparison, economies such as Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and, in particular the UK, 
reacted with µOLEHUDO¶ policies (Lallement 2011; Tridico, 2012). From this perspective the 
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crisis response of recent years has not required any overall ideological or policy paradigm 
change. Governments aimed to first and foremost restore stability, not change existing and 
institutionalised procedures and rules (van Hooren et al., 2014). This meant that policymakers 
in Europe ³generally used arrangements or schemes already in place prior to the crisis, 
extending oUPRUHDFWLYHO\VXSSRUWLQJWKHP´ (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2011 p. 25). In other 
words, path departure is very unlikely and ³there has been no new paradigm for governance 
HPHUJLQJDVDUHVXOWRIWKHFULVLV«KDYLQJDQHZSDUDGLJPUHTXLUHVQHZLGHDVDQGWKRVH
appear to have been in rather short supply´ (Peters et al., 2011, p. 26). Findings of incremental 
change in the form of layering, drift, conversion, displacement, and exhaustion (Streeck & 
Thelen 2005), rather than comprehensive institutional change, are therefore to be expected 
(Mayntz 2012, cf. Starke et al. 2013). 
While we agree that path-dependent pressures were important in shaping the response 
to the crisis in many European countries, prior studies have not explained well how such 
dependencies played out in practice. This general lack of clarity, with little focus on 
mechanisms which explain the path dependent processes, can at times even muddle the 
differences between path dependency arguments and arguments for policy convergence across 
regimes. 
 This also results in uncertainties regarding to what extent these conclusions are really 
competing, or, rather speaking to different levels of analysis. For instance, it has been shown 
that pre-crisis trends of welfare state retrenchment continued through the crisis years but also 
that these developments have been more or less consistent across welfare state regimes 
(Elsässer et al. 2015). Similarly, Fehmel (2012, p. 54) argues that European welfare states in 
WKHODVWWZHQW\\HDUVKDYHFRQYHUJHG³FRQFHUQLQJERWKWKHPHWKRGRIILQDQFLQJWKHVRFLDO
security systems and the social beneILWVOHYHO´Evidence of convergence is found in general 
and it is argued that reactions, despite some variations across regimes, followed one 
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overarching paradigm (Preunkert 2015), namely neoliberal policy prescriptions (Hermann 
2011; Farnsworth & Irving 2015). Thus, while these researchers highlight the presence of 
convergence around a general model or paradigm they also rely on the notion that this 
paradigm has remained stable throughout the crisis (Crouch 2011; Schmidt & Thatcher 2013).  
 While these indications of convergence cannot be ignored they do not necessarily 
serve as basis for making competing claims with those who have pointed to path 
dependencies. The differences might concern competing claims regarding the level at which 
path dependencies work. For instance, while states, not least EU Member States (cf. 
Holzinger & Knill 2005), converge around a common general paradigm, this paradigm is in 
itself associated with a high degree of path dependency. Even if we accept that European 
welfare states are generally converging around a common paradigmatic model, also affecting 
their crisis response, there are still numerous instances where path dependencies produce 
specific effects within a broader framework of convergence.  
 We argue that examining the narratives of crisis and the ways in which responses to 
crisis are perceived by key political actors helps us to better understand how the processes of 
path dependency and convergence might take place at different levels. The three cases chosen 
for analysis demonstrate the aforementioned dynamics as the respective welfare regimes in 
Sweden, Germany and the UK have arguably become less distinctive during the last 30 years 
(Holzinger & Knill 2005). However, their varied responses to the Great Recession (Chung & 
Thewissen, 2011) indicate that there are still non-negligible differences between them 
(Lallement 2011). Focusing on macro-economic indicators or policy documentation is not 
enough for describing these dynamics: we need additional information from those in the 
policymaking process which shows how the chosen responses to crisis relate to different 
aspects of institutional legacies and social norms. In particularly, we hypothesize that policy 
makers argue along the lines of their respective welfare regime when commenting, 
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interpreting and describing reactions to the crisis. Signifying the paradigms and welfare 
regimes they stand for, these interpretations and framings are core to the question of how path 
dependency works (Béland & Cox 2010). How bureaucrats, policy makers, and advocates 
perceived and framed the crisis is key as they shape action plans, advise politicians, and 
embody institutional (and ideational) stickiness. 
 
Case selection, method and data 
Our investigation builds on a systematic analysis of changes in labour market policy 
and social welfare policies in three countries which represent different ideal-types of welfare 
regimes (Esping-Anderson 1990; Arts & Gelissen 2002). Although conservative Germany, 
liberal United Kingdom and social-democratic Sweden are all members of the European 
Union and faced the same Great Recession since 2007, they carry significantly different 
institutional legacies. The cases are partly selected because prior studies, especially Chung 
and Thewissen (2011), provide detailed description of policy reforms in these countries and 
have shown that at least in the case of initial crisis response the changes followed the path 
defined by their institutional legacy. We can thus go one step further here and investigate the 
ideas behind this and whether it is really appropriate to describe the result as path dependent. 
The selected countries were affected by the crisis less than South European countries, but as 
shown in Figure 1, they still jointly experienced significant decline in economic growth in 
2009. Other figures such as economic strain or unemployment rate followed different patterns 
however, arguably due to the national economic composition and institutional legacies. 
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Our analysis also considers social welfare and labour market reforms before the crisis 
because, obviously, one cannot fully understand the reaction to crisis without knowing, for 
example, the initial level of welfare generosity or labour market policies. We aim to provide 
qualitative description of crisis response (cf. Starke et al. 2014), and information for the 
analysis is obtained from the careful reading of original policy documents, as well as semi-
structured interviews with over 50 key policy experts and bureaucrats from all three countries. 
Respondents were selected depending on their expertise within the fields of labour market and 
welfare policies, if they held positions during the crisis, and we concentrated on public 
officials and policy advocates rather than politicians in order to investigate the actual 
relevance of worldviews and institutional legacy within administrations, not only on the 
political-programmatic level. The idea behind this is that bureaucrats, policy advisers, 
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advocates, and administrators form discursive communities and policy advocation networks 
6DEDWLHU%UHVVHUV	2¶7RROHWKDWUHVHPEOHWKHLGHDWLRQDOIRXQGDWLRQof what we 
observe as path dependent policy reactions. By concentrating on government officials and 
advocates we complement studies focusing on the political sphere (e.g. Armingeon et al. 
2015) and emphasize the diffusion of respective paradigms within policy networks. 
Interviews were used both to put policy changes in their proper context, but also, crucially, to 
ascertain to what degree changes had been associated with the crisis and in which way. We do 
not aim to provide any generalizable picture of the process of crisis response, but offer a more 
contextually informed account of what prompted specific ways of responding to the crisis in 
these particular countries, well known for their stickiness of welfare institutions. Interviews 
with Swedish respondents are marked with SE and the respective interview number, for 
Germany we use DE and for the UK case UK.2  
   
Sweden: a social democratic response to crisis? 
Compared to many other European countries, the crisis had very moderate effects in 
Sweden. In its early stages, however there was a great deal of uncertainty in the Swedish 
government regarding how and to what extent the crisis would affect the Swedish economy. 
At this point government officials, in particular those responsible for finance, entertained a 
range of different scenarios, including ones of a complete financial and economic collapse. As 
one respondent stated in characterizing early perceptions of the crisis: µ:LOOWKHHFRQRP\RI
this society work at all? What happens if the banks were to collapse? Real nightmare 
VFHQDULRV¶ (SE 2). These perceptions of uncertainty and the possibility of a more wide-
ranging impact of the crisis, also fuelled by increasing unemployment rates, (see Figure 1), 
are important to understand the Swedish response to the crisis.  
                                                          
2
 A full list of respondents can be found in the appendix to this article. 
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While Sweden can still be characterized as a relatively comprehensive welfare state, in 
the 2000s and up to the Great Recession, Sweden engaged in reforms which formed a 
paradigmatic shift from the social democratic tradition of welfare generosity (Freeman et al. 
2008). These reforms, particularly social insurance and labour market policies adopted in 
2007 and onwards, were largely driven by the political agenda of the centre-right government 
first elected in 2006, and re-elected in 2010. Sickness benefits became regulated through strict 
time limits and there was a considerable increase in membership fees for unemployment 
insurance. Additionally, labour market programmes were re-focused on those farthest away 
from the labour market, that is, the long term-unemployed and newly arrived immigrants 
(Government of Sweden 2007; 2007a). The policy discourse of the coalition entering into 
office in 2006 constituted a reversal of the fundamental idea that welfare provisions are put in 
place to ensure inclusion in society on an equal a footing as possible. Instead, it was argued 
that citizens outside the labour market were victims of flawed incentive structures, which 
ZHUHHIIHFWLYHO\µlocking people in¶WRDGHSHQGHQF\RQWKHVRFLDOVHFXULW\V\VWHPDQGWKXV
excluding them from society (SE 1). Those receiving benefits were depicted as victims of the 
welfare state itself (they were not, as outlined in the UK section, cast as lazy or irresponsible). 
$OOSHUVRQVQRWDFWLYHLQWKHODERXUPDUNHWZHUHLGHQWLILHGDVµH[FOXGHG¶DQGHYHU\RQH
receiving different kinds of welfare benefits, such as disability pensions, unemployment 
benefits, and sickness benefits, were included in this category. This discourse is well 
described by one of our respondents, when reflecting on the introduction of cut-off points in 
the social insurance systems: 
There are clear incentives in these time limits. You will find this in both the 
XQHPSOR\PHQWLQVXUDQFHDQGWKHKHDOWKLQVXUDQFH7KHUHLVDIRUPRI«LW¶VQRW
IRUPXODWHGOLNHWKDWDQGZHGRQ¶WIRUPXODWHLWOLNHWKDWHLWKHUEXWWKHUHLVDIRUPRI
LQWLPLGDWLRQHIIHFW«(SE 7). 
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The ideas for stricter rules and a move towards a more targeted model were present 
before 2007, but required a centre-right government to introduce new legislation that left the 
Social Insurance Agency much less room for interpretation (SE 9; SE 10; SE 11; SE 12; 
Swedish Social Insurance Agency 2014). In sum, before the crisis there was a significant shift 
from a universal model towards a more targeted and corporate model with restricted eligibility 
and lower benefits, converging with the policy development in a broader European context.  
However, with the onset of the crisis in Europe and in Sweden, the initiated reforms, 
were actually slowed down, and in a few instances reversed. The unemployment benefit 
programmes which were otherwise reserved for long-term unemployed and young people 
were expanded: µ7KH\EURXJKWLQDUDQJHRIPHDVXUHVWRGHDOZLWKWKRVHZKRZHUHODLGRIIWR
deal with this temporary, externally induced recession.¶ (SE 1). The government at this point 
appeared constrained by the well-institutionalised legacy of the comprehensive welfare state 
and turned to solve the problem of increasing exclusion of people from the labour market (cf. 
Chung & Thewissen, 2011). Measures of µSXPSLQJPRQH\LQWRWKHV\VWHP¶ (SE 2) were 
otherwise contrary to the centre-ULJKWJRYHUQPHQW¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIZHOIDUHSURJUDPPHV
as contributing to exclusion. Rather than further accelerating restrictive welfare reforms, as in 
many European countries where austerity served as a key crisis response, the crisis slowed 
reforms down in Sweden: 
It was the way in which the crisis arose and the logic of how to deal with it that 
legitimized the shift in policy. Those measures were otherwise contrary to the general 
approach of the government. If the crisis would have been a more slow moving and 
long term recession that had led to people losing their jobs, perhaps the assessment 
would have been different, [but]  this we do not know. (SE 1) 
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The crisis was thus not perceived by the government as a consequence of a lack of market 
adaptation to new circumstances by businesses. Neither was it interpreted as connected to 
flawed structures of the welfare state. Rather, the perception was that it had little to do with 
the Swedish system at all and that it should be pushed back by any means available. These 
perceptions conditioned the response which included a slight expansion of benefits, although 
marginal, rather than their reduction. Furthermore, it slowed down the implementation of the 
broad package of reforms planned by the centre-right government.  
In the context of the crisis the scheduled reforms became politically more difficult and 
their projected positive results were eaten up by increasing levels of unemployment. As one  
UHVSRQGHQWLQWKH(PSOR\PHQW$JHQF\VWDWHGµThe government had maximum bad luck. They 
introduced the new rehab chain [the new restrictive rules]  at the same time as the worst crisis 
in ages happened. If they had foreseen that they perhaps would have waited¶6( Thus, 
the crisis led to a situation where the room for manoeuvre actually lessened. The fact that the 
administration of those labour market programmes was given more funds and that this 
funding was subsequently renewed during the crisis (Interview SE 7) points to how sticky the 
Swedish institutions are and how difficult it was to change the social democratic welfare 
system. Even the rhetoric of lock-in effects became less dominant as a result of the financial 
crisis and instead it became important to show that government cared about these large groups 
of people who had been laid off (SE 7). This is well exemplified by the abolishment of the 
model of differentiated fees in the unemployment insurance:  
Almost everyone agrees that this worked better on paper than in the real world. 
Removing the differentiated fees for the unemployment insurance was one of the most 
important demands for the labour organizations « this was where [the 
Government]  had to give in. (SE 5). 
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Apart from going back on some of the reforms in the field of labour market policy, 
there were also changes in the social insurance system. In this context, one can say that the 
Swedish centre-right government was rather constrained in its immediate policy-responses to 
crisis in the period of 2008-2010. Although it did not change the fundamental idea of their 
reforms, it continuously had to negotiate with the paradigmatic idea of an encompassing and 
generous welfare state, hence following the path established by many previous social 
democratic governments. Rather than using the crisis as an opportunity to further restrict 
access to welfare provisions, reforms in that direction were slowed down due to institutional 
pressure and the perception of the crisis as an external threat. The period after 2010 is, 
however, again characterised by the continuation of liberalization policies, at least until the 
new Social Democratic government came to power in 2014. In sum, for Sweden, the crisis 
seemed to have activated path dependent pressures and reduced the speed of an otherwise 
accelerating process of policy convergence towards a more liberal paradigm. 
 
UK: a liberal response to crisis? 
In many ways the economy in the UK did not decline any more severely than in Germany or 
Sweden, especially in terms of employment (UK 3; UK 4). However, the UK was particularly 
vulnerable in the longer term because of overexposure to the global financial system via the 
City of London, and a large housing market bubble sensitive to any restriction in credit 
availability. To contain the crisis the centre-left Labour government took an unprecedentedly 
interventionist approach to stabilise the threatened banking sector through nationalisation and 
recapitalisation of various banks. At their peak, these measures exposed the Treasury to 
liabilities of more than £1,000 billion (National Audit Office 2014, p. 13) and formed a large 
part of the increased government deficit shown in Figure 1. A policy advocate observed that, 
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µWhen the credit crunch first came it was very much about debt and finances and not so much 
DERXWWKHZLGHUµUHDO¶HFRQRP\¶ (UK 3).  
After initially supporting the bail-outs, the official opposition, the Conservative Party, 
began pushing a narrative of profligate spending by the Labour government, especially in the 
run up to the 2010 general election. To appear strong on the economy, Labour also took up 
the mantle that spending needed to be brought under control, with the Chancellor promising in 
WKHHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQWRPDNHFXWVWRSXEOLFVSHQGLQJµGHHSHUDQGWRXJKHU¶WKDQWKRVHPDGH
in the 1980s by Conservative prime minister Margaret Thatcher (Elliot, 2010). Consequently, 
the crisis came to be perceived as one of public spending, and the issue of the public deficit 
subsequently came to dominate policy responses to the crisis in terms of austerity and 
spending cuts (English et al 2016, Temple et al 2016). A government official noted how the 
µreally brutal deficit figures¶JDYHWKHLGHDRIVSHQGLQJFXWEDFNVµa certain level of impetus¶
further remarking that µFULVLVKDVSUREDEO\GULYHQDODUJHQXPEHURISROLFLHVZKLFKLQWHnd to 
VDYHPRQH\¶ (UK 10). 
,PSRUWDQWO\WKHILQDQFLDOFULVLVKLWWKH8.DJDLQVWDEDFNGURSRI\HDUVRIµ7KLUG:D\¶
OLEHUDOLVDWLRQKHLJKWHQHGHPSKDVLVRQDFWLYDWLRQDQG³FUHHSLQJFRQGLWLRQDOLW\´'Z\HU
2004) in the field of social security policy, in particular welfare-to-work provision (Whitworth 
& Carter 2014, p.106). This gives raise to two elements of path dependency observable in the 
UK responses after the crisis. Firstly, framed as a spending crisis, policy had to cutback on 
public spending and this was to be achieved through continuing and deepening the neoliberal 
reforms already underway in the UK. Secondly, tKHµVWLFNLQHVV¶RIVXFKDSDWKLVIXUWKHU
suggested by the widespread perception across interviewees that such an approach would be 
pursued regardless of which party was in government, a particularly salient observation since 
the UK had a general election two years into the crisis, which removed the long-standing 
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Labour government, and was facing another election just a few months after our interviews 
took place. 
When the centre-right Conservative-led coalition (2010-2015) ousted Labour, the new 
prime minister GHFODUHGDµSHUPDQHQWO\OHDQHUVWDWH¶WREHKLVSDUW\¶V end-goal. A member of 
the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) argued there was DQµoverriding objective¶
to contain the growth of social security spend and, when it came to the Conservative-led 
Coalition, there was µDYHU\FOHDUNLQGRIUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHFULVLVDQG
the policy agenda that is being pursued¶ (UK 1). Another interviewee provided further detail: 
«WKHQDUUDWLYHLVWRLQWURGXFHDXVWHULW\WKURXJKUHGXFWLRQLQJRYHUQPHQWEXGJHWV«D
SDUWLFXODUZLQJZLWKLQWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\«LVLQIDYRXURIDXVWHULW\IDOOLQJPRVWO\
on public spending and secondly, austerity falling mostly on social security spending. 
(UK 2). 
$VDJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVXFFLQFWO\VXPPDULVHGµZH¶UHQRWLQWKHEXVLQHVVRIVSHQGLQJ
money¶8. 
But this welfare retrenchment and spending cuts response to the crisis has to be 
contextualised. In terms of deepening the existing approach, a policy advocate was clear: 
µThey have introduced further activation measures, further conditionality rules and amplified 
the use of sanctions¶ (UK 1, emphasis added). As one of our interviewees noted, such an 
DSSURDFKIROORZHGDQH[LVWLQJSDWKRIµwelfare residualisation¶VRPHWKLQJKDUGWRWXUQDZD\
IURPDVIXUWKHUFXWVDQGUHWUHQFKPHQWDFWDVµIHHGEDFNORRSV¶ (UK 2). Building on this notion 
RIDQRQJRLQJGHYHORSPHQWDQDGYRFDWHQRWHGWKDWµWhatever wrapper you put around the 
policies they are essentially adding greater conditionality into the system¶ZLWKµ7KH8.
[having] been at the forefront of driving down the level of direct public investment into this 
stuff´  (UK 8). Arguably the &RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\¶VODERXUSROLF\ continued down the path 
introduced by New Labour before the crisis, but with increasing use of sanctions, stringent 
16 
 
 
activation measures and a more individualised approach to employment (Whitworth & Carter, 
2014) 
In terms of the broader social security narrative, as in Sweden the system was seen to 
EUHHGµZHOIDUHGHSHQGHQF\¶. Yet this issue had been highlighted by the pre-crisis Freud 
Report, commissioned by the Labour government (Freud 2007). In comparison to Sweden 
however, the UK narrative came to develop a focus on individualised blame: µThe government 
was very successful in portraying most of the welfare reforms and cuts as being directed on 
the workless or workshy ± using the phrases almost interchangeably¶ (UK 4). The 
Conservative Party built upon the narrative by diagnosing DµPRUDOKD]DUG¶LQWKHV\VWHP
which incited laziness and eroded self-discipline (Wiggan 2012, p. 400), leading to a narrative 
RIµWKHXQGHVHUYLQJZHOIDUHFODLPDQW¶*DUWKZDLWH5RPDQR5). 
Looking forward, it was clear across almost all interviews that this emphasis on 
cutting welfare expenditure was not only here to stay, but something accepted across the 
political spectrum (with the exception of the Green Party, who were generally seen as offering 
an alternative agenda, but having no access to power, and so limited influence on policy 
[UK3; UK10]). Regarding the then upcoming 2015 election, as one government official put it, 
µ:HOOZHKDYHWKHHOHFWLRQLQ0D\DQGOLNHO\VRPHQHZPLQLVWHUs but we will still have the 
brutal facts; there is still a large deficit to cut so we will be scraping around trying to work 
out how to not spend money¶ZLWKWKHDGGLWLRQDOREVHUYDWLRQWKDWµAny government would sit 
there and look at a large chunk of benefit spending and think ± KRZFDQZHUHGXFHWKLV",W¶V
perpetually a challenge¶ (UK 10). Such a viewpoint from a government official is backed up 
E\DSROLF\DGYRFDWHZKRQRWHGWKDWµThe broad consensus is the need to make cuts, and the 
difference concerniQJµZKHUH¶DQGµKRZ¶LVRQO\RQWKHIULQJHV¶ (UK 8). Other examples 
DUJXHGWKDWDIWHUµ/DERXUZRXOGKDYHGRQHWKHVDPHVRLW¶VQRWDKXJHDPRXQWRI
difference on the party side¶ (UK 5) and yet another noted that µ,GRQ¶WVHQVHWKDWWKHUH¶VD
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political movement in favour of significantly changing the direction of travel of our social 
security system (UK 1). Finally, a member of the Social Mobility and Child Poverty 
Commission (a non-departmental public body sponsored by Cabinet Office, Department for 
Work and Pensions, and Department of Education) argued this point particularly in relation to 
austerity: 
The policy space is a little bit of treading water at the moment to see what happens 
with the election, but either way, the broad tenets of austerity are going to be there, 
LW¶VMXVWDTXHVWLRQRISULRULWLHVDQGPL[(UK 4). 
The evidence of path-dependency in the UK then suggests it is of a particularly sticky 
nature. In a way this is not surprising; since coming to power in 1997, the New Labour 
JRYHUQPHQWKDGQRWDWWHPSWHGµWRUHVWRUHDSUHYLRXVVRFLDOPRGHOEXWLQVWHDGVRXJKWWRJUDIW
elements of social support and social investment onto the free-market policies of the previous 
Conservative governments¶*ULPVKDZ	5Xbery 2012, pp. (씀1 And so a return to 
power of the Conservative government might be expected to lead to only limited changes. 
Even the all-important financial interventions, had to µZRUNWKURXJKPRQHWDU\FKDQQHOV«to 
revive the supply of credit¶Hodson and Mabbet (2009, p. 1053, emphasis added), arguably 
offering limited substantive change to the dominant policy paradigm (Berry 2016). Therefore, 
what can be seen is an embedded neoliberal deepening in the period following the crisis, 
especially with the long-term austerity approach of the Conservative-led coalition. Over a 
decade ago, Oliver & Pemberton (2004, p. 435) argued that, since the late 1980s, a 
JHQHUDOLVHGQHROLEHUDOSDUDGLJPKDVEHFRPHHQWUHQFKHGLQDQµLWHUDWLYHHYROXWLRQDU\F\FOH¶ in 
the UK, carried forward into the 21st century. Our analysis clearly suggested that the process 
has not slowed as a response to the Great Recession, indeed, it has arguably strengthened; the 
8.KDVVLQFHUHWXUQHGWRDµSXUHU¶SDWKZLWKLQZKLFKWKHFRQILQHVRIpolicy are contained 
even more rigorously by the liberal paradigm.  
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Germany: the conservative response to crisis? 
An important reference point of German welfare state development is the µAgenda 
2010¶ reforms initiated in 2003 by the green-social democratic coalition. These reforms 
intended to make the labour market more flexible and to reform the conservative, 
contribution-financed, welfare state. Similarly to Sweden, and in contrast to the UK, this path 
of neoliberal reform was not pressed further during the crisis although it is contested now 
whether the reforms made it easier or harder for the German labour market to cope with the 
crisis.  
Again like Sweden and in contrast to the UK, Germany experienced limited long-term 
effects of the Great Recession. In comparison to both the other case studies, the 
unemployment rate, declining since 2005, continued to fall after 2009. Importantly, German 
public officials regarded the crisis as similar in character to previous downturns (DE 2), even 
though this one was acknowledged as being much more significant: µWKHELJHFRQRPLFVOXPS
RI¶ (DE 6). Regardless, it was interpreted first and foremost as a crisis of economic 
slowdown within a functioning model (Konjunkturkrise): the problems in the labour market 
were cyclical not structural (DE 1). In response, Germany undertook four potential Keynesian 
crisis measures ± investing in/securing jobs, introducing tax measures, investments in the 
infrastructure, and tax relief ± while Sweden took the first two and the UK took only one 
(investing in jobs) (Vis et al., 2011, p.  346). More concretely, the German government opted 
for short time work (STW), scrappage bonus and public investments in infrastructure (DE 3, 
DE 20). The growth packagHVZHUHFOHDUO\WDUJHWHGµThe investments in renovation of 
schools, kindergartens etc. were strongly neHGHGVRLWZDVQRW³GLJJLQJDhole and filling it 
again´¶ (DE 20). And, finally, the perception of the crisis was closely connected to the 
measures adopted: µ,WZDVFOHDUHDUO\RQthat there was no alternative to short-time work 
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because it was a cyclical drop in orders which was just enormoXV«WKLVZDVDOPRVW
unanimous¶ (DE 4). The interpretation of the crisis DVEHLQJµF\FOLFDO¶ worked as a µcoalition 
magnet¶ (Béland & Cox 2016) meaning that it helped to build a political coalition in response 
of the crisis, including the social partners in what is now discussed as crisis corporatism 
(Urban 2012). Still, many interviewees were surprised by the success of these Keynesian 
measures (DE 20), which indeed were thoroughly against the neoliberal reform path chosen 
with the Agenda 2010 reforms and which are not disputed within the administration.  
The German coordinated market economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001) profited during the 
crisis from the strongly interconnected system of industrial relations characterised by flex-
time work records and co-management by works councils, a set-up which needs a lot of trust 
on both sides (DE 2; cf. Herzog-Stein et al., 2013). Adding to already existing mechanisms of 
internal flexibility, the expansion and easing of STW was the most prominent and successful 
German crisis measure (together with flex-time agreements at the firm-level). Whereas 
German unemployment benefits were not changed during the crisis, the maximum duration of 
STW was extended from 6 months to 18 months (reversed in 2011). The motivation for 
initiating the STW measure was, according to our interviewees, both moral and practical. 
First, in a µsocial market economy¶, that is a regime like Germany, WKHJRYHUQPHQWµKDGWRGR¶ 
something against unemployment (DE 4), and the German mentality of stable jobs, in contrast 
to the µhiring and firing¶ in the United States, was perceived as an important part of the 
German political economy (DE 6). $JDLQWKHLGHDRIµVRFLDOPDUNHWHFRQRP\¶PD\have 
worked as a coalition magnet. Second, both coalition parties, the Social Democratic Party and 
the Christian Democratic Union (SPD and CDU(?2009) aimed to get µmoney into the 
markets¶ to support demand (DE 3) and, through the stabilisation of export-led industries, 
other industries were indirectly stabilised (DE 6). Since the crisis was not perceived as 
harmful in Germany as it was in the UK, and, as it was clearly interpreted from a different 
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perspective which fitted the conservative model (first and foremost: stable employment), there 
were also fewer efforts to manage the budget deficit via welfare cuts. The German health 
sector had been the target of reforms long before the crisis, and there were no measures that 
were as µKDUVK in terms of social policy¶ as the ones of the labour policy (Agenda 2010) 
reforms before the crisis (DE 14). One change during the crisis was the reduction of the health 
insurance rate paid by both the employer and the employee aimed at stabilizing the economy: 
µThis was a relief to the employers and employees. And this was an unusual anti-cyclical 
SURFHVV¶ (DE 14). However, this rate was restored after the crisis, with a cap on the 
employer's side which continues the reform path of the pre-crisis period. 
Therefore the austerity package in 2010 was, overall and notwithstanding the pressure 
it put on social aid beneficiaries, small and it re-established the pre-crisis policy course. Yet it 
contributed to restoring trust in the government's ability to cope with the crisis. The austerity 
package was not only psychological but, also a mesVDJHWRWKH(XURSHDQSDUWQHUVµEven if our 
deficits were not so bad, you have to cut, so for us the whole package had to be the same 
direction so it was coherent from a European perspective¶DE 16). Moreover, reducing or 
raising social aid could not be a central part of growth or austerity packages, as this would 
mean a deviation from the µsubsistence minimum¶ as defined by German law. A lower 
deviation from this minimum is illegal due to a Supreme Court ruling (09/02/2010), and even 
in the crisis a higher deviation to support domestic demand was not justifiable, following the 
conservative, technocratic paradigm (DE 16). This court-ruling offered a clear institutional 
hindrance for any significant change in social policies. The references to established rules are 
DQLPSRUWDQWHOHPHQWRI*HUPDQEXUHDXFUDWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFULVLVDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\IRU
understanding the specific shape of policy responses. 
To sum up, after the outbreak of the crisis Germany took immediate and costly 
measures to keep employment up and stimulate the economy. The reforms were unusual in 
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their clearly Keynesian character and interventionist approach and contradicted the neoliberal 
reform course of the pre-crisis years. Yet, based on the institutional setup of Germany, the 
tradition of the conservative welfare regime and the strong interconnection between social 
actors and the government, coordination worked smoothly and the measures were almost 
undisputed. However, these measures were limited in time ± and this is not surprising giving 
the perception of the crisis as a temporary economic slump and the strong belief in the 
German welfare regime. Changes in welfare policies (e.g. health and care insurance schemes) 
continued the development of the pre-crisis period and therefore we do not observe a 
considerable shift in policies or paradigm in GermanyUDWKHULWVWD\HGRQWKH³FRQVHUYDWLYH´
path with a, after the crisis, continued focus on liberal reform. 
 
Concluding discussion 
We set out to look more closely at the crisis responses in three welfare states which, while 
faced with similar external pressures, answered in different ways resulting in differing crisis 
experience. Rather than engaging in a comparison of macro-level indicators, our analysis took 
a more open-ended approach allowing us to capture, in a more nuanced way, sometimes 
parallel, seemingly conflicting, movements of policy convergence and path dependency. In 
the literature we observe a cleavage between scholars who argue that path dependencies 
prevail (e.g. Chung & Thewissen, 2011; Lallement, 2011) and those who emphasize 
convergence (e.g. Pontusson & Raess, 2012; Shahidi, 2015) and pointing at the strengthening 
of neoliberal policy agendas across Europe (Hermann 2014). Our interview analysis showed 
how the Great Recessions triggered reactions in labour and social welfare policy which are 
highly path dependent, but sit within a broader framework of (neoliberal) convergence. In 
contrast to prior studies, we have not aimed to set path dependency and convergence against 
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each other, but demonstrate that by focusing on the explanations of bureaucrats and policy 
advocates we can better understand path dependency pressures in times of crisis.  
The social and labour policy reforms in these three countries did not converge around 
a general crisis response policy as their membership in the EU might suggest. This is 
particularly interesting as, before the crisis, Sweden and Germany manifested clear 
indications of convergence with welfare reforms of a more liberal character. These pre-crisis 
UHIRUPVZHUHVXEVHTXHQWO\µVRIWHQHG¶ as a response to the crisis. Fear of crisis-induced 
unemployment lead path dependent pressures to shape responses such as the initiation of the 
STW-scheme in Germany and widening access to labour market benefits in Sweden. In the 
UK, on the other hand, the already highly liberal character of its welfare system was further 
hardened in the face of the recession. Since the UK model already largely aligned with the 
wider understanding of convergence, the path dependent reactions follow the same logic. The 
financial stimulus packages in the earlier stages of the crisis did not shift the UK onto a 
different crisis response path; the dominant discourse of the Conservative-led coalition 
government was paradigm-reinforcing rather than paradigm-threatening (Hay 2013). 
Consequently, in contrast to Sweden and Germany, the crisis in the UK was very much 
discussed as connected to the size of the state, the generosity of systems of benefits and 
flawed incentive structures in those systems. Austerity measures in terms of further cutting 
back on services and benefits have therefore become a central part of the UK¶s crisis 
response. 
These differences, especially between the UK and Sweden, demonstrate well the dual 
process of path dependence and convergence. Before the crisis, the reforms in Sweden and 
Germany, were sometimes even motivated by similar arguments to those in the UK, 
especially as concerns the pervasive view that an overly generous welfare creates exclusion-
effects. There was thus convergence towards a common logic of welfare reforms, especially 
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the notion that incomes on benefits should never supersede those of people in employment. 
Still, the framing of recipients of welfare benefits as lazy and work-shy, while prevalent in the 
UK, did not become a dominant paradigm in Sweden. Rather, typical to social democratic 
welfare regimes, the systems of benefits were largely seen as structural impediments for 
individuals in realising their full potential, which in this context was taken to mean being 
gainfully employed. In Germany, respectively, the main concern was the protection of the 
core work force. The crisis-related reforms in the examined welfare states demonstrate that 
governments did not use, or were not able to use, the crisis as a window of opportunity for 
more radical labour or social policy change. In all three countries, the crisis pushed policy 
makers towards well institutionalised policy measures and familiar narratives - demonstrating 
the importance of institutional legacies. These legacies are effective as policy paradigms and 
shared by bureaucrats and policy makers that hold and subsequently act according to 
respective worldviews (cf. Immergut & Anderson 2008; Schmidt 2003). 
Theoretically the results of this study indicate that debates regarding to what extent 
European welfare states are converging around a common model or if they are following their 
own paths have not always been productive. Rather, this analysis of crisis response in 
Sweden, Germany and the UK offers a nuanced reflection on how path dependencies and 
convergence pressures interact to produce particular policy outcomes. This was an analysis 
also attuned to how conflicting pressures can exist simultaneously on different levels. A 
broader application of this approach in comparative welfare state research would likely be 
associated with significant gains, both empirically and theoretically.  
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Appendix: List of respondents, interviewed in May-August 2014 
Full list of respondents in Sweden 
SE 1: Government official, Ministry of Employment. 
SE 2: Government official, Ministry of Employment. 
SE 3: Government official, Ministry of Employment. 
SE 4: Government official, Ministry of Employment. 
SE 5: Government official, Labour Market Committee of the Swedish Parliament, non-
politically appointed. 
SE 6: Government official, Labour Market Committee of the Swedish Parliament, non-
politically appointed. 
SE 7: Government official, Swedish Employment Agency. 
SE 8: Government official, Swedish Employment Agency.  
SE 9: Government official, Ministry of Social Affairs. 
SE 10: Government official, Social Insurance Agency. 
SE 11: Government official, Social Insurance Agency. 
SE 12: Government official, Social Security Agency. 
SE 13: Government official, Parliament Committee for the Social Insurance. 
SE 14: Government official, Parliament Committee for the Social Insurance. 
SE 15: Government official, Parliament Committee for the Social Insurance. 
SE 16: Government official, Parliament Committee for the Social Insurance. 
SE 17: Government official, Parliament Committee on Taxes. 
SE 18: Government official, Parliament Committee on Taxes. 
SE 19: Government official, Parliament Committee on Social Affairs. 
 
Full list of respondents in UK 
UK 1: Member of Social Security Advisory Committee. 
UK 2: Independent expert on social exclusion.  
UK 3: Manager, Poverty Team in the Policy and Research Department, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. 
UK 4: Member of Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission. 
UK 5: Social and economic research fellow, centre-right thinktank. 
UK 6: Government official. 
UK 7: Head of research, centre-left thinktank. 
UK 8: Assistant director, National Housing Federation. 
UK 9: Director, democracy campaign organisation. 
UK 10: Government official, Department of Work and Pensions. 
UK 11: Government official, Department of Health. 
 
Full list of respondents in Germany 
DE 1: Government official, Bundeskanzleramt 
DE 2: Government official, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
DE 3: Government official, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
DE 4: Government official, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
DE 5: Government official, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
DE 6: Government official, Federal Agency of Employment 
DE 7: Government official, Federal Agency of Employment 
DE 8: Government official, Federal Agency of Employment 
DE 9: Member of Parliament 
DE 10: Government official, Federal Ministry of Family, Social Affairs, Women and Youth 
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DE 11: Government official, Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
DE 12: Government official, Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
DE 13: Government official, Federal Ministry of Family, Elderly, Women and Youth 
DE 14: Government official, Federal Ministry of Health 
DE 15: Member of Parliament 
DE 16: Government official, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
DE 17: Government official, Federal Ministry of Finance 
DE 18: Government official, Federal Ministries of Economy and Innovation and of Finance 
DE 19: Government official, Federal Department of Finance 
DE 20: Government official, Federal Ministry of Environment 
DE 21: Government official, Federal Ministry of Environment, Construction and Reactor Safety 
DE 22: Government official, Federal Ministry of Environment, Construction and Reactor 
Safety 
 
 
 
 
